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IS “NONTHEIST QUAKERISM”
A CONTRADICTION OF TERMS?
Paul Anderson

I

s the term “Nontheist Friends” a contradiction of terms? On one
hand, Friends have been free-thinking and open theologically, so
liberal Friends have tended to welcome almost any nonconventional
trend among their members. As a result, atheists and nontheists have
felt a welcome among them, and some Friends in Britain and Friends
General Conference have recently explored alternatives to theism. On
the other hand, what does it mean to be a “Quaker”—even among
liberal Friends? Can an atheist claim with integrity to be a “birthright
Friend” if one has abandoned faith in the God, when the historic heart
and soul of the Quaker movement has diminished all else in service to
a dynamic relationship with the Living God? And, can a true nontheist
claim to be a “convinced Friend” if one declares being unconvinced of
God’s truth? On the surface it appears that one cannot have it both
ways. One cannot by definition be an “unconvinced Quaker,” and
one cannot claim a “birthright” while declaring also from its central
tenets—either for potage or more substantive gain.
So, what are Quakers to do about a group that advertises themselves
as “Nontheist Friends”? Is this a case of liberal Friends going too far,
threatening to cut themselves off not only from their spiritual heritage
but also from the rest of the global Quaker movement? They are
certainly welcome to do so, but can they retain the names “Quaker”
or “Friend” with integrity, or must these historic and theological
terms be ceded to others if one truly becomes a nontheist?

Belief In “No God” Among Modern Skeptics
Of course, the propounding of skepticism and atheism is ubiquitous
in the modern era, so these discussions among Friends are not unique.
Apparent in recent critiques of belief in God, however, some have also
come to advocate an obverse “belief in No God” as a tenet of faith.
Therefore, unlike the mere questioning of religious belief in God,
declaring belief in “No God”—and religiously so—inevitably inherits
the same liabilities of theistic religion and theology. The question is
5
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how adequate such a stance is, and whether nontheism as a religion
and counter-faith is a good thing, intellectually or otherwise.
Nearly four years ago I enrolled as an academic member of the
National Newswriter’s Association and attended their national
meetings held that year in Washington D.C. hoping to see how
religion journalists were covering religious issues in America. An
interesting session was held on “We Believe in No God, and You
Shouldn’t Either,” featuring Jennifer Michael Hecht (author of
Doubt: A History), Barry Kosmin (director, Institute for the Study of
Secularism in Society and Culture), and Paul Kurtz (founder, Center
for Inquiry). The presentations were engaging, as arguments for
secularism and atheism were propounded despite statistics showing
that over 96% of people in America believed in some sort of God or
divine being.
I found myself, however, drawn into the fray during the discussion,
standing in line waiting to ask my questions of the panelists because
some of their work was terribly problematic intellectually. Hecht’s
presentation was especially inadequate; she argued in favor of atheism
citing such luminaries as Plato, Aquinas, and Jefferson being “on
our side” and disparaged all references to Jewish-Christian scriptures
as solely “religious” and therefore irrelevant to anthropological or
sociological fields of scientific inquiry. As a biblical scholar, I pointed
out that most critical biblical scholarship in the modern era is done
scientifically (after all, my first book was published in Tübingen’s
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neues Testament series—
the Scientific Investigation of the New Testament) with interests in
anthropology, sociology, economics, politics, rhetoric, psychology,
and virtually every other field of academic inquiry; so, marginalizing
all biblical references as religious-only, and thus irrelevant to other
fields of inquiry, betrays one’s dismal ignorance of a longstanding
academic field—an object of her critique.
While such a sweeping lacuna by a public scholar may be
contextualized—though not excused—by noting that Hecht was
referencing a field outside of her primary knowledge base, citing
Plato, Aquinas, and Jefferson as allies of atheism or nontheism is
intellectually incomprehensible. Plato argued for one God—the source
of ideal truth, goodness and beauty, against the many lesser “gods”—
projections of human investments and loyalties and declared himself
“guilty” of the charge of seeking to corrupt the youth of his day away
from their materialism toward a higher and transcendent understanding
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of truth and its implications for living. Aquinas unquestioningly was
the greatest Christian theologian between Augustine and Luther, and
while his disputatio method of inquiry was indeed analytical, to say
he did not believe in God is laughable. His five-fold proof of the
existence of God might not be equally compelling in all respects,
but just because he advocated critical questioning does not mean he
disavowed theism. Jefferson was a deist, not an atheist. He believed
in God but held that God’s work in the world was limited to natural
means rather than supernatural ones. Further, he professed against
critics to be an authentic Christian and in his later years cut and pasted
the sayings of Jesus in a folio by which to direct his life; he believed in
Jesus’ teachings and took them to heart.
What surprised me about Hecht’s presentation is that such a set
of intellectually inexcusable statements could be made by someone
arguing for intellectual advance and acuity. This seemed to me a public
display of intellectual shoddiness at best—intellectual dishonesty at
worst. Then again, I may have misunderstood her argument. If she
was connecting “a history of doubt” to consequential “atheism,” in
opposition to “a history of faith” and “theism,” that might account for
her merging of categories with undue fluidity, but not all skepticism
leads to atheism or reflects it. So, clarifying what is meant by doubt
and belief, let alone theism, atheism, nontheism, and other terms, is
essential to the larger discussion.

Godless For God’s Sake?
In 2006 a book was published featuring the essays of 27 Quakers
claiming to be part of a movement referring to itself as Quaker atheists
and nontheists.1 As several discussions of atheism, nontheism, and
alternatives to theism had been conducted among British and North
American Friends, this book and its attending website attempt to
forge a movement among Friends challenging not only traditional and
biblical views of God and the spiritual life, but also the very question
of God itself, asking if Friends might be better off liberated from the
restraints of assuming God exists and is active in the world. Citing
a parallel from an Indian doctor regarding a picture of Ganesh, the
Hindu god with the head of an elephant, David Boulton quotes him
as saying, “I believe, trust and have complete confidence in every
attribute of Ganesh—except his existence” (p. 13). By extension,
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Boulton argues for embracing the attributes of God (love in action)
independent from believing in God’s existence.
The collection features ten essays seeking to build a case for Quaker
nontheism (a softer form of atheism, although several contributors
do claim to be atheists) and nineteen testimonials. Most of the
contributors believed in some sort of spiritual reality we might term as
“God” but had problems with particular descriptions of that reality. If
that is indeed the case, I’m not sure they should see themselves as strict
atheists or nontheists; they are actually doing theology. The question is
how well they are doing theology; is it adequate or impoverished? One
of the things I noticed is that while such Anglican nontheists as Don
Cupitt and Shelby Spong are cited among some of the writers, and
while Paul Tillich is mentioned some, the great theologians of recent
decades, such as Karl Barth, John Zizioulas, Hans Küng, Wolfhart
Pannenberg, Karl Rahner, Nancey Murphy, and Jürgen Moltmann
are absent from the discussions. This makes one wonder if streams of
influence are a bit on the shallow side, intellectually.
I also question the presentation of statistics; while one survey
purports that a quarter of British Friends surveyed disbelieved or had
some doubts about whether God existed (7% answering “no” and
19% answering “not sure,” pp. 102-103), another question in the
survey notes that 98% of British Friends listed “There is that of God
in everyone” as “very/quite important” (p. 109)—the highest score
among all theological tenets. If nearly all British Friends value highly
the appeal of George Fox to “that of God” within every person, do
a quarter of them really believe in No God? And, the highest value
among Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Friends surveyed in 2004 (78%)
was “For me, Meeting for Worship is a time to listen for God” (p.
109). Therefore, if “listening for God” in meetings for worship
scored highest on the list of convictions for Philadelphia Yearly
Meeting Friends, this suggests a strong interest in attending and living
responsively to the Divine—however one understands that reality.
Reviews of the book were quite negative in The Friend and Friends
Journal, although responses to the reviews were mixed. Tony Stoller2
asks whether we should “seek out a sense of belonging and goodness
which is apart from God, indeed which denies the existence of God
as anything much more than a rather anachronistic myth” or whether
we should “resoundingly re-affirm that we are indeed theists, that we
believe in and strive to know a theological God, that we are consciously
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the Religious Society of Friends. If we are unable or unwilling to
return God’s embrace, then what in the end is the point of being a
Quaker?” Initial positive responses to Stoller’s critique include Diana
Lampen’s questioning the statistics (given that belief and unbelief
are on a continuum), Chris Barber’s affirming the reality of God
whatever one calls it, and Joseph Gamblin’s suggestion that seeking
a relationship with God is “an excellent guide for Meetings when
considering future applications for membership.” Initial negative
responses include Paul Holdworth’s being less bothered by asking
hard questions than the certainty of some theists and David Boulton’s
appreciation-yet-clarification that the contemporary question is not
God’s existence, but what is meant by those speaking about “God”
or “the Spirit.” Boulton then queries whether “compassion in action”
might be a good way to describe that reality we refer to as “God”—
also as a means of returning “the divine embrace.”3
Marty Grundy’s review in Friends Journal (November 2006, pp.
25-26) was more programmatic in its critique. Noting that not all the
contributors to this book were happy with the label “nontheist,” as
they also exhibited a good deal of diversity rather than coherence, she
claims Boulton’s opening reference to Meister Eckhart is misleading:
Eckhart “was not saying the best thing is to discard God, but rather to
lay aside our fondest ideas, definitions, and expectations about God,
to step into the void and in the unknowing find the Presence.”4 More
pointedly, Grundy questions why a movement so directly opposed to
Quaker faith and practice should be welcomed among Friends, noting
the following problems:
•

If foundational convictions of early Friends included such
testimonies as “Christ is come to teach his people himself,”
“the power of the Lord is over all,” and “the Lord did
gather us up as in a net,” then denying “the experiential
availability of the Living God” goes against these central
Quaker beliefs.

•

Dismissing “by fiat Quaker understandings of Truth” the
approach of the book is based on several unquestioned
assumptions: only what is apprehended through the senses,
only what is inside one’s own head or experience, only that
which can be comprehended by human intellect is “real.”

•

While experience is repeatedly asserted to be the
contributors’ only measure of truth, “they have deliberately
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chosen to emasculate their own experience and to
misinterpret that of others.” This includes denying the
religious experiences of Quaker founders as well as Quaker
contemporaries who testify to having had transformative
encounters with God.
•

“Does this book prove the difficult negative that God
does not exist? No. Does it prove that the contributors’
varying interpretations of nontheistic humanism belong
in the Religious Society of Friends? No. Ignorance of,
or misuse or misappropriation of language, image, and
metaphor does not change the reality of the matrix within
which these symbols are embedded, and toward which they
point.”

•

While the essayists emphasize the importance of action,
they neglect the spiritual origin of Quaker praxis, raising
the question as to whether today’s Friends have neglected
central components of membership, which involves
understanding how central components of Friends worship,
community, and social action are rooted in the theology
and experience of “primitive Christianity revived.”

Responses to Grundy’s critique were mostly negative, although Philip
Hunt is taken with her invitation to be shown experiential proof of
the belief that God does not exist.5 Loomis Mayer notes that Christ
can be known as a figure of history if not as a supernatural deity; Chris
Knight wonders if this is postmodern Quakerism, even if essays might
not speak to “our” condition; Harriet Heath asks whether our belief
in continuing revelation might allow us to welcome those who do
not share our beliefs in God.6 Elizabeth Willey asks if we are not all
seeking God’s truth whatever we call it; Rosemary K. Coffey asks what
we will profit from exclusion; Susan Furry asks whether “recognizing
that of God in each other” challenges Grundy’s query as to whether
“Friends have become so ‘sloppy’ in membership procedures that we
have accepted people who don’t belong.” She testifies to having been
an atheist but upon experiencing “that secret power” in the meeting
for worship that Robert Barclay described—weakening the evil and
raising up the good within—things changed personally.7 Then again,
such an experience with the numinous seems more like a movement
from atheism to Quakerism, leaving the former behind, rather than a
viable merging of the two.
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Chuck Fager’s review in Quaker Theology, however, was not
only positive; it was laudatory:8 “What have we come to in Friends
religious thought, when the most exciting book of Quaker theology
I’ve read in years is produced by a bunch of Quaker non-theists–
twenty-seven in all?” Fager even describes his appreciation as a Quaker
theist (“or perhaps more accurately a failed non-theist”). Rather than
being scandalized by asking tough questions of God, Fager notes the
biblical precedent of Job, described as “perhaps the earliest biblical
theological treatise.” Indeed, biblical Job’s situation challenges
theological understandings of God’s justice, love, and power, as
contemporary inquiries about God also do. Fager traces “the long
pedigree of religious non-theism” within American Quakerism to
Lucretia Mott 160 years ago and references an “apostolic succession”
of Quaker non-theists ever since.9 He then attacks quite severely
Marty Grundy’s review, calling it “distressing, even a bit shocking”
for ones like her to be “wringing hands and reeling aghast at the
infiltration of infidels into their orthodox sanctuary, and calling for
a purge to clear up the Society’s ranks.” Fager concludes with citing
Jesus’ measure of faithfulness, “by their fruits ye shall know them,”
and claims that because such is so, “nontheist Friends have as much
claim to a legitimate place in contemporary Quakerism as many who
feel they are defending the last true redoubt against the invading
forces of unbelief.”
Among these reviews, the major concern is whether atheism and
nontheism go against the central Quaker ethos, which prioritizes the
seeking and responding to the inward workings of the Living God. Of
course, attempts to define the Infinite and to comprehend the Ultimate
are beyond capacities of human means and constructs (religion and
theology), but the religious quest as a spiritual endeavor to encounter
and be directed by an immanent Divine Being has been the central
thrust of the Jewish-Christian faith for millennia, and Friends have
felt called to be radically devoted to faithful responsiveness within
the human-divine relationship. If, as Boulton and others claim,
there is no Divine Other, and what we conceive as “God” is merely
(not just somewhat) a projection of human imaginations, this is
categorically different from historic and authentic Quakerism, by any
measure. Denying the central thrust of the historic Quaker quest—a
transformative relationship with the Living God—is far different from
missing a plank or two in the larger party platform.
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Straightening Out The Language About Theism
and its Alternatives
The first imperative in exploring alternatives to theism is to straighten
out the language, as discussions of theism and nontheism reside within
a field of reasoned inquiry: theology. Of course, any approach to doing
theology, seeking to understand its central subject—theos (God)—is
fraught with challenges. How is the invisible realm of the Divine, the
Absolute, the Transcendent, the Ultimate to be apprehended by finite
humans? Is there one god or many? How do we know that God exists,
or not; and, what is meant by “existence”?10 Does humankind have
a source, and if so, is the Ground and Source of our Being personal,
loving, just, and true, or have humans risen above their originative
source? Did life flow from nonlife? To affirm the reality of God in any
sense, however, does not explain what God is like or how to relate to
God. That’s what theology also does, providing understandings also
of the human-divine relationship.
The map is not the territory, and yet maps are also helpful in
navigating the terrain. Central theological problems address issues of
what we think of God’s being all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing
(omniscient), and all-loving (omnibenevolent) given the fact of human
suffering and apparent evil. This evokes the problem of theodicy (the
justice of God). How could a just, able, and loving God allow tragedy
and devastation in the world? Either God is unjust (either cruel or
unfair), inept (either unknowing or unable), or unloving (and thus
unworthy of conscientious respect). Ways theologians have addressed
these classic issues, especially in post-Holocaust, post-colonial, and
post-modern perspective, include limiting God’s activity (God acts
spiritually rather than physically), challenging the finality of loss
(finding meaning or even benefit in suffering), noting obstacles
to God’s sovereign action (personified evil, human disobedience,
natural disasters), or rejecting the notion of God altogether or at least
somewhat (approaches of atheism and nontheism).
Of course, every approach has its own strengths and weaknesses,
so the rich history of theological debates about God over three or
more millennia poses an important basis for addressing these issues
thoughtfully. Unfortunately for Friends, however, the fact that we
have neglected second-order reflection (the map) in favor of firstorder encounter (the territory) means that while many Friends are
quite intellectually advanced in any number of fields, we are all
too often intellectually impoverished when it comes to theological
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discussions.11 At times those intrigued with nontheism unwittingly
reject entire subjects of study without being aware of alternatives to
particular theological problems. They simply do not know the history
of inquiry; at times they do not care. Therefore, understanding the
larger issues and discussions, as well as the meanings of particular
terms, is important if Friends wish to engage meaningfully in debates
about the character and existence of God. Following are some basic
ways of understanding some of the terms bandied about—at other
times sidestepped—within these larger discussions.
Theism—the belief in a divine being, lending itself to a variety
of views related to God’s involvement with humanity, the
meaning of life, moral normativity, and the origin and character
of the natural realm. If the cosmos has an origin, if there are
elements of design in natural and material realms, if personhood
has a source, if there is that than which nothing greater can be
conceived, affirmative answers to these questions point to God.
Many types of theism abound, often emerging as factors of how
one deals with various inferences about God and the world.
Deterministic Theism—the belief that because God is all knowing
and all powerful God controls what happens in the world. In
some destinarian systems, God elects the saved and the damned;
therefore, one must accept one’s fate and infer God’s sovereign
hand in whatever comes in life. Because one’s salvation is not
dependent on what one does, some once-saved-always-saved
approaches diminish the role of human responsibility and moral
choices.
Open Theism—the view that God is sovereign and all powerful,
yet God limits Godself to the choices that humans make because
of God’s love for humanity and honoring of persons’ autonomy.
As a result, history is a factor of human choices and actions, and
because God is personal and responsive to prayer, humans play
a role in the unfolding of God’s redemptive work in the world.
Process Theism—the view that God is dynamic and becoming
rather than unchanging and static. If human and other
organisms, in their development and processive movement
toward actualization, reflect the character of their maker, an
improvement over classical theism sees God’s perfection as a
factor of processive interactivity with humans and their choices.
Therefore, humans are involved in the unfolding history of
God’s will as a factor of the human-divine relationship.
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Monotheism—the belief that there is only one God and that such
a Being calls humans into a covenantal relationship involving
stipulations for humans and consequences wrought by God.
In Hebrew Scripture’s presentation of a conditional covenant,
where God’s people obey God’s laws blessing results; where they
disobey adversity follows. Unconditional covenants in Scripture
also show God’s gracious bestowal of blessing regardless of
human merit.
Polytheism—the belief in multiple gods, often in conflict
with each other, reinforced by mythic narratives of one deity
conquering competitors. In ancient times, the victory of
one party over others was interpreted as a victory within the
pantheon, legitimating the veneration (sometimes forced) of the
victors’ deity over others.
Animism—the belief that spirits inhabit natural items, leading to
attempts to appease the spirits or gods related to one’s interest in
order to receive favors. Totemism often results within animism,
as elements within a culture lead to the representation of values
in ways serving the inculcation of norms within a society—
characteristically projections of human values and aspirations
understood in sociological terms.
Pantheism—the belief that all of nature and all of God are one.
Therefore, God is not a personal being, nor is God transcendent;
rather, God consists of “the whole show”—the sum of the
parts of the natural cosmos. Such a view leads to moral realism,
considering outcomes rather than principles as decisive in ethical
considerations.
Panentheism—the belief that the reality of God includes the
natural order but also extends beyond it. Therefore, God is at
work through the natural world but is not distanced from it,
although God’s existence and activity also transcend it.
Deism—the belief that God exists, but as an impersonal force
rather than a personal being involved directly in the direction
of the natural order. God is known through reason and the
observation of nature, not through revelation and divine
disclosure. Like a divine clock-maker, God has “wound up” the
universe, which runs according to natural laws and patterns;
God’s truths are self-evident.
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Skepticism—a stance of defaulting to doubt rather than belief,
proof is required before a tenet is accepted. Verification hinges
upon empirical demonstrability as ascertained by the senses,
leading to a preference for materialism over and against idealism.
As God is invisible and inaudible, skeptics doubt claims of
religious experience and appeals to revealed truth.
Logical Positivism—a reduction of truth to what is positively
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Characteristically, positivism
limits claims of verification to that which is empirically or
logically demonstrable; obversely, positivism limits claims of
falsification to that which is demonstrably overturned. With
relation to God’s existence, the primary question hinges upon
where the burden of proof lies—proving or disproving the
existence of God.
Naturalism—the limiting of reality to the natural order,
explaining phenomena without appeals to divine action
or disclosure. God, while not necessarily denied within
methodological naturalism, is considered irrelevant to human
endeavors, as reality is explicable on the basis of natural laws
and cause-and-effect relationships. Then again, metaphysical
naturalism sees the cosmos as a closed system independent of
the need for God.
Materialism—the limiting of reality to the realm of physicality,
therefore rejecting the reality of God on the basis that God is
unseen and materially inaccessible. In tension with idealism,
materialism assumes that the material is all that is and all that
can be meaningfully engaged. Therefore, ideal and transcendent
realities are disregarded in the quest for truth and meaning.
Scientism—the view that because of its robust operation and
promise science holds the answer to everything, including
the meaning of life and the origin of human existence. Often
competing with religion as a primary source of authority in the
modern era, the elevation of science to mythic levels of authority
sometimes goes beyond what scientific inquiry can actually
deliver, taking on the semblance of a new religious movement.
Atheism—the belief that God is not. As a result, the origin of the
world must be explained alternatively, not as a factor of creation
or design but as a factor of other processes emerging for no
apparent reason. In its modest forms, atheism simply makes
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no allowance for divinity, supranaturalism, or revelation. In its
stronger forms, atheism challenges religious conventions and
assumptions claiming to pose a superior alternative.
Nontheism—a softer form of atheism preferring secular
alternatives to theism and corollary beliefs in God. While
humanism also has strong Judeo-Christian underpinnings in
western society, nontheists often appeal to humanist, secular,
and naturalist approaches to issues. Nontheists tend to see
God as irrelevant and problematic, and thus sidestep issues of
religious faith overall.
Therefore, as Friends discuss theism and its alternatives, they should
understand what is meant by terms and how they are discussed within
different schools of thought. For instance, any critique of theism
must first identify which sort or aspect of theism it is addressing, as
well as what historic discussions of particular tenets have emerged. If
one objects to deterministic theism, might open or process theism
pose a way forward? If one operates largely within laws of naturalism,
might panentheism still allow a view of God who works through the
natural order but also beyond it? If evil or tragedy in the world calls
for an explanation, what do we do with human goodness and apparent
redemption as realities? Might a supposed “nontheist” actually be a
deist or a natural theologian—still believing in God but assuming God
works in more spiritual and revelatory ways than interventionist or
mechanistic ways? As natural theology is an established and respected
field of inquiry,12 a preference for naturalism does not require one to
abandon theology or theism. One may do that, but it is naïve and
uninformed to assume that such is the only choice.
As Friends engage these enduring subjects, they should consider
the strengths and weaknesses of all sides of issues and should be modest
in their claims as well as plain in their articulation. As Martin Marty
has affirmed, the best way forward in fruitful theological discussion is
appreciating the strengths of the arguments one finally rejects while
also being mindful of the weakness of the views one embraces.

Problems With “Quakers” Believing

in

“No God”

Given that some have begun to identify themselves publicly as
“Nontheist Friends,” this creates severe problems for the larger Quaker
movement, despite having several strengths as well as weaknesses.

is

“nontheist quakerism” a contradiction of terms? • 17

Among strengths, the first is that theological discussion is
happening, and Friends are asking some really hard questions
about important subjects. With Fager, this is a strength of a robust
theological inquiry, although I would encourage those interested in
this theological subject to read broadly and in conservative directions
as well as liberal ones.13 I would pose a mirror-image opposite
recommendation for theologically conservative Friends to read those
outside their camps, as well. This is what it takes to do theology well.
On the other hand, if the authentic quest for God is removed from
theological inquiry, is the central struggle of theology itself lost? As
Chuck Fager has well described the character of theology elsewhere,
as being like Jacob’s struggle with the angel, if the reality of God is
removed from the struggle, can there be any tension-filled (and thus
adequate) theology?
A second strength is the energy that David Boulton, Os Cresson,
and others have been putting into the discussions; such is impressive
by any measure. Of course, this would apply to any special interest
among Friends, and perhaps Stoller’s pointing out that Quakers are
indeed theists should lead to a “Theistic Quakers” special-interest
group as a means of recovering a diminished feature of Quaker
faith and practice. Then again, that may be redundant, as Quakers,
historically and internationally, have sought to live receptively and
responsively to God—a form of dynamic theism. If liberal Quakers
become nontheistic, will they tolerate meetings of theistic Friends
in their midst, or will they exclude or shame them for their lack of
doubt? Doubtless, that could happen.
A third strength is the emphasis on the “fruits” of whatever comes
from believing in No God. On one hand, the point is well taken, and
the impressive Quaker credentials of contributors to the book make
a strong statement as to their standing within the Society of Friends.
On the other hand, if “works” also imply letting one’s “yes” be yes
and one’s “no” be no, how can leading Quakers affirm the convictions
of their communities of faith if they declare publicly that they do not
believe in their affirmations of God? And, if good works pose the
measure of value, have atheistic leaders been the most compelling of
witnesses within the last century?14 Then again, Boulton’s citing of
Mohamed Atta’s “faith in God” shows how problematic ill-defined
theism can be.15 Indeed, God and the teachings/example of Jesus
have been primary bases for the Quaker Peace Testimony, so without
God as a principled basis it is doubtful that Quakers will long remain
pacifists.16
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Despite its strengths, weaknesses with the movement are more
pronounced in my view—at least if nontheists wish to maintain an
explicitly Quaker identity.
One weakness, as noted in the reviews, is that “Nontheist
Quakerism” is a contradiction of terms. If the rise and progress of
the people called Quakers has sought to diminish all else (speculative
theologizing, cultic formalism, dead religiosity) in the interest of
encountering the Living God experientially, the denial of such as a
reality, or even as a possibility, means one rejects historic Quakerism.
Conversely, if one believes in God and seeks to know God, even if
the Ground and Source of our Being continues to be a mystery that
defies human understanding, one cannot rightly call oneself an atheist
or a nontheist. This is not a matter of some people excluding others;
it is a factor of attempting to embrace mutually exclusive realities
simultaneously.
A second weakness with the movement overall is that it sometimes
comes across as intellectually naïve and somewhat superficial. The
existence of God is a rich and varied subject of inquiry, and particular
types of theism, as well as their alternatives, have intensive and extensive
histories of intellectual engagement. Therefore, understanding the
meanings of terms and the rich theological literature within particular
schools of thought, before accepting or rejecting a doctrine, is basic
to adequate inquiry. Further, virtually all academic theologians today
think critically about God and how God is known and understood,
and virtually all biblical scholars today operate naturalistically dealing
with the facts of texts, cultures, and the histories of ideas. That, of
course, creates other problems, but approaching God and the Bible
rationally and critically, without appealing to supranatural factors,
is basic to these disciplines and unexceptional. This does not mean,
though, that all theologians and Bible scholars are nontheists, though
they operate disciplinarily in rational and analytical ways.
A third weakness is not intrinsic to the movement, but it is far too
common to command respect. In several cases, religious authorities
are yoked to the nontheist cause inappropriately—either haphazardly
or dishonestly. I don’t think Boulton’s citing of the great Christian
mystic as basis for the title and thrust of his nontheistic book reflects
intellectual dishonesty; I just doubt that he (or Don Cupitt, perhaps)
has really thought about how Eckhart was dealing with St. Paul’s
own theological-communal struggles in Romans 9. I also don’t know
that all the Quaker luminaries cited by Os Cresson in his online
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essays deserve to be linked too closely with nontheism. While
Cresson correctly acknowledges that not all of the people mentioned
were nontheistic (indeed, very few of them were) their questioning
skepticism in ages past does not link them necessarily with nontheistic
views today. All nontheists might be liberal, but not all liberals are (or
were) nontheists. This is especially the case with Cresson’s presentation
of Henry J. Cadbury as an atheist or a nontheist.18
Despite Cresson’s frequent quoting of Cadbury’s claim to being
“no ardent theist or atheist” as proof that he was a nontheist, Cadbury
was not denying being a theist in that statement. He was simply
distinguishing his personal religion from ways he taught his Bible
courses at Harvard Divinity School and elsewhere. The responsibility
of a biblical instructor within an academic setting is to discover the
plain and clear meaning of the text rather than imposing one’s personal
beliefs, letting the text speak for itself—problematic or otherwise.
Bible teachers call this “exegesis” (digging out the best meaning
of the text) rather than “eisegesis” (inserting one’s beliefs into the
text).19 While Cadbury was wonderfully understated in describing
his religious beliefs and experience,20 claiming also to be neither a
literalist nor a mystic, this does not mean that he did not see himself
as a deeply committed Christian who believed in God.21
As a logical positivist, he challenged the certainty of all claims, and I
believe he also would have challenged the certainty of nontheist claims
as well as conservative ones. As he never claimed to be a nontheist,
his name should not be associated with “Nontheist Friends” directly
and in the name of intellectual integrity should be removed from
websites and other sources claiming such. Cadbury also claimed he
was no…atheist. As David Boulton and others would affirm, though,
he did point to Woolman as the model of his religious faithfulness—
caring less about doctrinal definitions and deity references than deityfaithfulness (or God’s love) in action. Woolman, however, did not
believe his divine errands were merely of human origin, which is why
they carried their moral and prophetic weight—a direct factor of their
originative thrust. If Woolman had not believed in a Loving God—the
Source of love and justice—would he have taken up his prophetic
challenge to injustice in the same world-changing way? I doubt it.
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Conclusion
While multiple varieties of theism have their problems, I’m not sure
that belief in No God is an improvement. Without a personal, loving,
and just Ground and Source of our Being directing self-centered
humans to be other-centered and self-effacing—at times directively
and empoweringly so—humans cannot love others, even as they might
like to. While people do tend to “make God in their own image,” as
Boulton and others well remind us, it is also true that seeing ourselves
as made in the divine image—that of One who acts redemptively in
history, and who came to earth in the flesh, embodying God’s selfgiving love in his life and death—calls us to live sacrificially, graciously,
and lovingly because its character is a scandalizing affront to the
seductive empire of the individual. As Elton Trueblood so often said, a
cut-flower society can last for a while, but without being connected to
its theocentric roots, it will soon wither and die. Phenomenologically,
how does second- and third-generation atheism tend to fare? Belief
in No God has the same theological challenges as belief in God; the
question is how those difficulties will be navigated theologically,
experientially, and ethically by newfound adherents.
But what about “Quaker Nontheists” as an organization or a
movement; is it a good thing or not? Well, any time people can be
inspired to ask hard questions and seek the truth rigorously, this is
good. The question is how to do so in ways that do not deny local
and covenantal Quaker communities. If one is a hard atheist (or even
a strong nontheist) this is problematic if seeking God and following
God are important to one’s Quaker affiliations. Questioning is one
thing, but declaring publicly one’s belief in No God and commitment
to challenging the beliefs and experiences of any and all who embrace
a Divine Being—in theory or in praxis—excludes all people of earnest
faith, which is not very “Quakerly.”
How will committed nontheists speak to “that of No God” within
every person? How will nontheists embrace any who have felt the
healing salve of the Divine Embrace? How will “nontheist Friends”
regard the history of the People Called Quakers, who, with Isaac
Penington, were guided by the Light of Christ, the Seed of God, and
the Power of the Holy Spirit working within the conscience of the
individual? People are welcome to regard all who are given to a God
beyond themselves as deluded, as atheists and some nontheists do,
but in doing so, they exclude all committed members of the Society
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of Friends—past, present, and future (if there is a future)—from their
fellowship.
If Quakers seek to be nontheists, though, they should commit
themselves to seeking the truth well and with integrity, as Quakers have
characteristically done, even if holding open the possibility of God’s
existence. Or, they could say, “others may, but I cannot,” without
judging those who, unlike them, have encountered God (as did the
Quaker former “skeptic” John Wilhelm Rowntree), believe in God,
and are seekers of God. They will need to seek truth with rigor and
inclusivity, reading conservative material as well as liberal material—
weighing strengths and weaknesses of arguments fairly and with
discerning judgment. They will need to speak with modesty of claim—
not making overreaching statements about messianic implications of
believing in No God, and certainly resisting the misrepresentative
yoking of respected authorities to their cause when those same
religious leaders would not likely claim to believe in No God. They
will need to keep true to the commands of Jesus to love neighbors,
enemies, and one another, even if they cannot commit themselves to
loving a non-existing God, and even though they reject an ontological
basis (God’s love for us) for doing so. If such commitments, however,
become onerous as encumbrances, or against the currents of atheism/
nontheism overall, they might consider dropping the “Quaker” part
of the association, as Quakers have historically prioritized receptivity
and responsiveness to the Living God above all else.
Is “Nontheist Quakerism” a contradiction of terms? Perhaps
not, if questioning theism is a factor of seeking the truth, whether
it confirms or counters one’s understandings of the Deity. That
simply means that one has become (goodness!) a Quaker theologian.
If, however, one commits to atheism or nontheism, against their
yearly meeting’s faith and practice and against the historic and global
Quaker movements, that seems incompatible with Quaker integrity.
So, emerging nontheists are welcome to wear their Quakerism as an
ornamental trapping “as long as they canst,” but eventually they will
have to choose between a faith and practice rooted in knowing and
following God and a declared belief in No God.
After all, taking leave of “god” (theology) for God’s sake (and
God’s truth) is one thing; taking leave of the Living God due to
theological perplexities over what is meant by “god” is another.
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